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Abstract—The evolution of communication technology and
the proliferation of electronic devices have rendered adversaries
powerful means for targeted attacks via all sorts of accessible
resources. In particular, owing to the intrinsic interdependency
and ubiquitous connectivity of modern communication systems,
adversaries can devise malware that propagates through interme-
diate hosts to approach the target, which we refer to as transmis-
sive attacks. Inspired by biology, the transmission pattern of such
an attack in the digital space much resembles the spread of an
epidemic in real life. This paper elaborates transmissive attacks,
summarizes the utility of epidemic models in communication
systems, and draws connections between transmissive attacks and
epidemic models. Simulations, experiments, and ongoing research
challenges on transmissive attacks are also addressed.
Index Terms—cyber security, epidemic model, malware prop-
agation, mobile social network, targeted attack
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researchers have successfully borrowed
several biological mechanisms from the nature for devising
efficient protocols and understanding their performance via the
associated mathematical models, especially for cyber security
in communication systems [1], [2]. Inspired by epidemiology,
this paper investigates an emerging attack pattern, transmissive
attack, featuring heterogeneous propagation paths and specific
targets. Analogous to the spread of epidemics in the nature,
malicious codes act as viruses that are capable of infecting
hosts (i.e., electronic devices) via various communication re-
sources, and they can be stealthily transported by intermediate
hosts to reach the primary hosts (i.e., targets), which is similar
to the biological mechanism known as host specificity.
Inevitably, the proliferation of electronic devices equipped
with communication capabilities, and the penetration of Inter-
net of Things have created ever-increasing security threats that
we call as digital epidemics, which may be even more vital
than actual transmissive diseases like Dengue Fever, Ebola or
SARS due to their cyber transmission and dormant operation
nature, and their induced loss in properties and privacy. It is
worth mentioning that although the fragility of modern com-
munication systems may seem to be a shocking news to the
world, the severe consequences caused by digital epidemics
have been foreseen by researchers [3]–[5]. In the past two
decades various advanced communication technologies such
as cellular systems and wired and wireless networks, and
tremendous user activities such as online social networking
and mobile applications have constituted a heterogeneous yet
ubiquitous network among users and devices around the globe,
which is known as a complex communication network [6]
or a generalized social network [5]. Malicious codes are
able to exploit these heterogeneous communication paths and
intrinsic system interconnectivity for propagation and thereby
compromise more devices.
By investigating recently discovered attack cases and system
vulnerabilities, we present an emerging attack pattern named
transmissive attack, where an adversary can leverage diverse
communication paths and common communication protocols
(e.g., Internet of Things) to indirectly compromise a target
(or a set of targets) that cannot be directly accessed by the
adversary. Furthermore, in order to increase the possibility
of reaching the target, transmissive attacks may camouflage
their activities to elude detections rather than indiscriminately
infesting as many hosts as possible. The specificity to tar-
geted attacks and heterogeneity in propagation paths distinct
transmissive attacks from well-known Internet worms such as
Code Red that only exploits single propagation resource (the
Internet) and features indiscriminate attacks.
Fig. 1 illustrates several possible means for the adversary
to access the target1. Consider the target to be a personal
computer in an enterprise that is granted access to private
employee/customer databases or confidential corporate files,
and all external networking connections to the target are
prohibited. If the target is connected to other internal machines
that connect to the outside world, the adversary can eventually
reach the target by successive propagation. Pessimistically,
even if all connections from other internal machines to the tar-
get are prohibited, the adversary can still manage to approach
1A detailed attack scenario is provided in the supplementary file.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of transmissive attacks and their propagation paths. Transmissive attacks exploit various communication resources for
propagation in order to reach the target. This diagram shows some examples of propagation paths that lead to the target.
the target by compromising the authorized user’s electronic
devices such as portable storage devices, wearable devices
or health devices embedded in human body equipped with
communication capabilities. In practice all the adversary needs
to launch a transmissive attack is simply release a malicious
code (e.g., a Trojan virus) and then sits back and waits
for the code to propagate among hosts (potential victims),
either via cyber connection (e.g., phishing from the Internet)
or human carrier (e.g., Bluetooth or WiFi direct reception
from proximity), to create an indirect (i.e., multiple-hop)
communication path for accessing the target. Moreover, after
successful intrusion the adversary can erase its traces from
the communication path (e.g., implementing a global timer
for self-deactivation) to reduce the risk of being uncovered.
Inspired by biology, we use epidemic models to evaluate
the consequences of a transmissive attack from a macroscopic
system-level perspective. Analogous to disease transmission
assessment, epidemic models categorize the hosts in a system
into a few states to analyze the collective behavior of a
system with parametric mathematical models (e.g., coupled
state difference equations or Markov chains) for the purposes
of status tracking, outbreak prediction, and further actions.
As a first step toward analyzing transmissive attacks, we use
epidemic models to investigate the probability of successfully
compromising the target and quantify the risk of exposure with
respect to time. We show that the tradeoffs in time between
the probability of successful intrusion to the target and the
associated risk can be characterized by epidemic models,
thereby enabling security analysis2.
II. TRANSMISSIVE ATTACKS IN PRACTICE
As illustrated in Fig. 1, one typical scenario of transmissive
attack is that an adversary aims to approach a target by
propagating through intermediate hosts via all possible com-
munication resources in a complex communication system.
The purpose of such an indirect propagation can be that
direct access from the adversary to the target is unavailable,
or the adversary attempts to hide his/her true identity by
manipulating compromised machines to launch an attack,
such as the exploitation of mobile devices as botnets [11].
It is worth noting that a transmissive attack can be more
insidious due to inherent configurability of electronic devices
carried by a user, e.g., programmable in-body health devices or
wearable mobile devices, which enables malware propagation
even when typical communication devices such as cell phones
and laptops are prohibited.
In addition to hidden identity, another appealing advantage
of the transmissive attack is that the adversary need not to
know the complete network topology to accomplish the attack.
All the adversary needs to do is release a transmissive mali-
cious code and then waits for the malicious code propagating
2Although in recent years epidemic-like information propagation has been
well studied in communications society in the contexts of “epidemic routing”,
where packets are transmitted in a store-and-forward fashion in intermittently
connected networks, little is known on how to apply these well-developed
analysis tools [7]–[10] to model transmissive attacks and beyond.
TABLE I: Statistics of Vulnerabilities Identified on Popular Applica-
tions and Platforms.
Number of Vulnerabilities
Applications & Platforms 2013 2014 2015
Adobe Acrobat Reader 66 44 129
Apple iPhone OS 90 120 375
Apple Mac OS X 65 135 384
Apple WatchOS - - 53
Google Android 7 11 130
Microsoft Internet Explorer 129 243 231
Microsoft Office 17 10 40
Microsoft Windows 7 100 36 147
Linux Kernel 189 133 77
Source: http://www.cvedetails.com/
to the target due to its transmissive nature. In practice a
transmissive attack can be simply accomplished by devising a
Trojan virus designed to be operated in the stealthy transmis-
sive mode during propagation and activated when reaching the
target. Advanced transmissive attacks can camouflage normal
user/network activities to elude intrusion detection or system
monitoring, thereby incurring severe threats to security and
privacy.
One of the most notable targeted attacks is the Stuxnet
attack discovered in 2010. Stuxnet is designed to target a
specific version of industrial control systems in a surreptitious
manner, whereas traditional worms often aim to infest as many
hosts as possible in a short time period. Stuxnet thus exhibits
several distinguishing characteristics compared with traditional
worms: each Stuxnet worm only replicates itself for at most
three times; it is programmed to self-destruct on a day in 2012;
it can stealthy propagate via carriers (i.e., vulnerable Windows
computers) without showing any symptoms and only unpack
its malicious payload when reaching a target; multiple zero-
day vulnerabilities are used. Although performing a targeted
attack may be expensive, and indeed Stuxnet is believed to
be state-sponsored malware due to its unprecedented level of
sophistication, more and more Stuxnet successors (e.g., dudu
and Flame) demonstrate how far an adversary is willing to go
for high-value targets.
Stuxnet is one kind of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT),
which can be seen as one specific case of transmissive at-
tacks. An APT possesses the feature of specificity in targets.
Although the feature of heterogeneity in community paths is
not mandatory for an APT, it would shorten the process to
approach the targets if heterogeneous community paths are
considered. In 2013, Mandiant3 summarized the attack life
cycle of APT: 1) Initial compromise, 2) Establish foothold,
3) Escalate privileges, 4) Internal reconnaissance, 5) Move
laterally, 6) Maintain presence, and 7) Complete mission. An
APT attack often loops through steps 3 to 6 until it reaches the
specific target. These steps are also applicable to transmissive
attacks.
To launch a successful transmissive attack, an attacker
3APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/
would also like to increase heterogeneity in community paths,
e.g., by exploiting diverse vulnerabilities. The statistics of
recently reported vulnerabilities (Table I) shows the numbers
are consistently increasing for most platforms and applications,
even for modern mobile and wearable devices. Consequently,
various activities and mediums including web downloads,
document reading, e-mail reading, short messages delivery,
Wi-Fi access, Bluetooth access, and NFC contacts can be
used together to deliver malicious payloads and approach the
targets. By leveraging these existing vulnerabilities, an attacker
can even launch transmissive attacks in the background and
be invisible to a user.
For example, in July 2015, an unprecedented vulnerability
in Android system called Stagefright was revealed by the
cyber security firm Zimperium4. Stagefright leverages the
vulnerability of the media library to access users’ Android
devices through a simple multimedia message service (MMS)
without users’ awareness567. As approximately 80% of mobile
devices use Android systems, nearly 1 billion devices are
potential victims345. By viewing mobile users using different
operating systems as hosts with different levels of immunity
to a virus, the Stagefright vulnerability behaves like the host
specificity in epidemiology, as it can compromise users using
Android systems.
III. OVERVIEW OF EPIDEMIC MODELS
Here we provide an overview of classical epidemic models
that have been applied to communication systems, particularly
for modeling information dissemination, malware propagation,
and developing the associated control methods8.
Following terminologies from biology and epidemiology,
each device in a communication system can be categorized
into a few states representing its status. The main utility of
such an abstraction is that one can leverage epidemic models to
simplify complicated interactions among each individual and
extract collective information for large-scale analysis and pre-
diction, e.g., tracking pandemic spread patterns and predicting
their outbreaks in terms of the infected population. A popular
analogy is that each device is either in the Susceptible (S),
Infected (I), or Recovered (R) state, known as the SIR model.
For epidemic modeling of normal information dissemination
dynamics, such as routing in communication networks, rumor
or news spread in social networks and so on, an infected
individual means he/she carries certain message (e.g., a data
packet) to be delivered, a susceptible individual means he/she
4https://www.zimperium.com/
5http://fortune.com/2015/07/27/stagefright-android-vulnerability-text/
6http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/07/27/android-text-
attacks/
7As quoted from Zimperium chief technology officer Zuk Avraham,
“These vulnerabilities are extremely dangerous because they do not require
that the victim take any action to be exploited. Unlike spear-phishing,
where the victim needs to open a PDF file or a link sent by the attacker,
this vulnerability can be triggered while you sleep. Before you wake
up, the attacker will remove any signs of the device being compromised
and you will continue your day as usual - with a trojaned phone.” Source:
http://venturebeat.com/2015/07/27/researchers-find-vulnerability-that-affects-95-of-android-devices
8Due to reference count limitations only a subset of related works are
introduced in this section. Interested readers can refer to [7]–[10] and the
references therein for more details.
does not carry that message but can be potentially infected,
and an recovered individual means he/she is immune to
the message and hence ignores the message upon reception,
e.g., in a cooperative relay-assisted network a device in the
recovered state will refuse to receive or forward the packet.
For epidemic modeling of malicious codes propagation
dynamics, such as privilege escalation or system vulnerability
leakage, an infected individual means he/she is compromised
by a malicious code and is being leveraged as a warm bed
for further propagation or attack, e.g., a botnet. A susceptible
individual means he/she is not comprised yet still vulnerable
to the malicious code. A recovered individual means he/she
is free of the threats incurred from the malicious code, e.g.,
securing one’s devices via frequent security patch updates.
The following paragraphs introduces three basic epidemic
models and relevant control techniques.
A. SI Model
SI model assumes each individual is either in the susceptible
or the infected state. It can be used to estimate the reception
performance of a broadcasting protocol or the dynamics of
a malicious code. In [4], the authors show that information
dissemination in a fully mixed network of dynamic topology
and opportunistic links, e.g., a mobile contact-based network
that possesses time-varying traces due to mobility, and tempo-
ral connections due to opportunistic contacts, can be captured
by an SI model. In [12], the authors show that the trends
of self-propagating Internet worms such as Code Red and
Slammer can be successfully predicted by SI models. In [5],
the authors use the SI model to formulate malware propagation
in a hybrid network composed a social network and a proximal
network, where a malware can leverage delocalized links (e.g.,
through MMS) and localized links (e.g., through Bluetooth)
for propagation.
B. SIS Model
Similar to the SI model, SIS model also assumes each
individual being either in the susceptible or the infected
state. The difference is an SIS model allows an individual to
transition from the infected state to the susceptible state. SIS
models can be well mapped to the formulation of a typical
two-state Markov chain where the steady-state behavior of the
entire system is used for analysis. The utility of SIS models
can be found in formulating recurrent network behaviors, such
as the trends of receiving spam mails, or information dissemi-
nation in an evolving environment with system reconfiguration
factors. In [13], the authors integrate the SIS model with
queueing theory to study malware propagation dynamics in
a dynamic network.
C. SIR Model
SIR model is a widely used model in energy-constrained
systems (e.g., a wireless sensor network) or communication
systems with control capabilities over information delivery
(e.g., a configurable routing protocol). An infected individual
can transition from the infected state to the recovered state
when certain events occur, e.g., a sensor stops to forwarding
packets due to battery drain. A susceptible node can transition
to the recovered state when certain mechanisms are activated,
e.g., a computer is no longer vulnerable to a malicious code
after installing the corresponding security patch or upgrading
its operating system. In [14], SIR model is used to study
the vulnerability of broadcast protocols in wireless sensor
networks. In [7], [8], SIR model is used to analyze the
performance of several protocols for epidemic routing.
D. Control Techniques
One major advantage of using epidemic models for model-
ing dynamics of information delivery or malware propagation
lies in the fact that their analytical expressions much ensemble
coupled state equations appeared in control theory, which
allows one to quantify a cost function of interest and evaluate
the performance of a control strategy. A commonly used cost
function rooted in various applications is the accumulated
infected population within a time interval. For instance, in
store-and-forward based routing schemes such as epidemic
routing, the accumulated infected population from the time
epoch when a source releases a packet to the time epoch when
the packet is no longer carried by any individuals is considered
as a cost function for data transmission. It can be interpreted as
the system-wise buffer occupancy for data transmission since
all infected devices need to keep the packet in their own buffer
until the destination successfully receives the packet.
Notably, although epidemic routing enables communica-
tions in intermittently connected networks, its spreading nature
inevitably induces additional system burden, especially for
buffer occupancy. In [7], the authors propose two strategies
for controlling buffer occupancy, which we call by the global
timeout scheme and the antipacket dissemination scheme. In
the global timeout scheme, each infected individual drops the
packet in its buffer when the global timer expires. In the
antipacket dissemination scheme, as motivated by vaccina-
tion from immunology, upon packet reception the destination
releases an antipacket as an indicator of acknowledgement
(ACK) and asks every encountered individual to forward the
antipacket so that infected nodes can erase the obsolete packet
from its buffer, and susceptible nodes can be prevented from
receiving the already delivered packet, and hence achieving
buffer occupancy reduction.
In [9], the authors consider time-dependent control capabil-
ity of SIR models in hybrid networks, where the control ability
is proportional to the elapsed time, e.g., the ability to restrain
malware propagation increases with the time spent in reverse-
engineering its operations. An optimal control strategy based
on dynamic programming is proposed for solving the optimal
time epoch to implement the control strategy (analogously
releasing the antidotes) in order to balance the tradeoffs
between effectiveness and consequences.
IV. CONNECTING THE DOTS: EVALUATING TRANSMISSIVE
ATTACKS VIA EPIDEMIC MODELS
Although transmissive attacks can be a serious threat to
cyber security, they are often accompanied with an additional
price compared with traditional attack schemes. Notably, their
spreading nature and self-propagating patterns enhance the risk
of exposure, and hence the attacks may be more likely to be
detected. Generally speaking, while an attacker can accelerate
the processes of reaching the target by compromising addi-
tional hosts, such an increased level of malicious activities
becomes easily identified, thereby jeopardizing the purpose
of the attack. To this end, there is a tradeoff between the
probability of a successful attack and the risk of being detected
due to excessive exposure.
To quantify this tradeoff between attack successfulness and
risk of exposure for transmissive attacks, we propose to use
epidemic models for analysis. The risk of exposure is the
accumulated infected population (i.e., accumulated number
of compromised hosts) from the time 0 when the adversary
launches a transmissive attack to the time T when the target
is comprised, or the time when the adversary decides to
abort the attack, as the longer the duration of a host being
compromised renders an attack more prone to be detected.
The attack successfulness at a time instance t is defined as
the probability of successfully accessing the target between
the time interval 0 and t.
For further illustration, we consider the scenario where the
adversary adopts the global timeout scheme for transmissive
attacks as his/her control technique to reduce the risk of
exposure. A global timer is set since the attacker launches
a transmissive attack, and upon global timer expiration all
malware residing in the compromised hosts will erase their
traces via complete self-deletion, no matter the attack is
successful or not, so as to allow the adversary to constrain
malware propagation and alleviate exposure.
Under the global timeout scheme an interesting question
that naturally arises is: what is the optimal global timeout
value TG such that the attack successfulness at time TG is no
less than a certain value (e.g., 80%) while the risk of exposure
can be minimized? Partial answers to this question were given
in the contexts of minimizing the system buffer occupancy
while simultaneously guaranteeing end-to-end data delivery
reliability between a source-destination pair for epidemic
routing [15], where the data delivery reliability and the buffer
occupancy are proven to be associated with the accumulated
infected population under the SIR model [8].
Particularly, if the mobility pattern follows a homogeneous
mixing mobility assumption, such as the random waypoint
model or the random direction model, a closed-form expres-
sion of optimal global timeout value is provided in [15] that
given a data delivery reliability guarantee, the optimal global
timeout value that minimizes the system buffer occupancy
depends on the initially infected population and the pairwise
meeting rate. This suggests that if mobile botnets (i.e., several
initially compromised hosts) are utilized to launch a transmis-
sive attack, the global timer should be set smaller than that of
a single seed to minimize the risk of exposure. Similarly, the
global timer should decrease when the pairwise meeting rate
is higher due to more frequent encounters facilitating malware
propagation. Moreover, an interesting finding in [15] is that the
optimal buffer occupancy grows exponentially with the data
delivery reliability. Analogously, for transmissive attacks the
exponential growth rate suggests that the risk of exposure can
be significantly amplified if an adversary desires higher attack
successfulness.
It is also proven in [15] that when adopting the optimal
global timer the per-user buffer occupancy does not depend
on the total population for epidemic routing. This suggests
that for transmissive attacks the risk of exposure for a single
host can be controlled to a certain extent such that its local
risk does not increase with the total host number.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND SIMULATIONS
In this section we conduct several simulations and experi-
ments as a first step toward the analysis of transmissive attacks
using epidemic models. In particular, we investigate the trade-
offs between the attack successfulness and risk of exposure by
simulating global-timeout-value enabled transmissive attacks
in mobile networks with two widely adopted mobility models,
namely the random waypoint (RWP) mobility model and the
random direction (RD) mobility model. We also evaluate the
effect of propagation path diversity of a mobile social network
on transmissive attacks based on mobile and social interaction
patterns extracted from real-life datasets.
A. Simulation of Transmissive Attacks in Mobile Networks
We simulate the traces of a mobile network of N mobile
users moving around in a wrap-around L×L square area. Any
pair of users can exchange information for communication
when they are within distance r of each other. For RWP
mobility model each user selects a destination at random and
travels to the destination at a constant speed v. Similarly, for
RD mobility model each user selects a direction at random and
travels at a constant speed v. For both models the speed v is
randomly and uniformly drawn from the interval [vmin, vmax].
Initially (at time 0) one user is compromised to launch a
transmissive attack and the target is selected at random.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 display the attack successfulness and the
risk of exposure with respect to the global timeout value TG,
respectively. Given TG, the attack successfulness is defined as
the fraction of simulated transmissive attacks that successfully
approach the target prior to time TG among all trials, and
the risk of exposure is defined as the accumulated compro-
mised population divided by the total population N . The SIR
epidemic model proposed in [15] is used for performance
comparison. The successful rate is the probability of infecting
a particular host, and the risk of exposure is evaluated using
the accumulated infected population.
It can be observed that the global timeout value TG indeed
governs the performance of both attack successfulness and risk
of exposure. The simulation results also validate the tradeoffs
between these two metrics as the enhancement in attack
vulnerability often leads to the increase in risk of exposure, and
vice versa. For example, to enhance the attack successfulness
from 30 % (TG = 10) to 90 % (TG = 20), the risk of exposure
needs to be amplified by 10 times. Notably, the predicted
results from the epidemic model can successfully capture the
trends of these two metrics. An immediate utility is that an
adversary can use the epidemic model to determine the optimal
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Fig. 2: Successful rate for transmissive attacks with respect to varying
global timeout value TG in mobile networks simulated by RD
and RWP mobility models. The system parameters are N = 100
mobile users, r = 0.1 km, L = 2.5352 km, vmin = 4 km/h,
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are averaged over 10000 trials.
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Fig. 3: Risk metric corresponding to Fig. 2. Epidemic models are
capable of predicting both the attack successfulness and risk of
exposure.
global timeout value that guarantees the attack successfulness
while simultaneously minimizing the risk of exposure, e.g.,
selecting TG = 25 such that the attack successfulness is no less
than 95 %. Moreover, a defender can also utilize the epidemic
model to evaluate a system’s vulnerability without conducting
time-consuming simulations.
B. Experiment of Transmissive Attacks in Mobile Social Net-
works
To investigate the impact of propagation path diversity on
transmissive attacks, we use the CRAWDAD mobile-social
interaction traces9 to simulate a transmissive attack. The
purpose of this experiment is to study the consequences of
transmissive attacks that are capable of propagating through
social contacts (e.g., via MMS) or proximity contacts (e.g.,
via Bluetooth). In such a mobile social network the malware
9CRAWDAD dataset thlab/sigcomm2009 (v. 2012-07-15). Available at
http://crawdad.org/thlab/sigcomm2009/20120715
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Fig. 4: Successful rate for transmissive attacks in a mobile social
network: exploiting both social and mobile propagation paths can
significantly improve the possibility of approaching the target. The
propagation parameters ps = pℓ = 0.05, and the results are averaged
over 10000 trials.
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Fig. 5: Risk metric corresponding to Fig. 4: the accumulated infected
population with respect to time. The results show clear tradeoffs
between attack successfulness and risk of exposure.
can propagate from one compromised user to another user
with probability of success ps via the social propagation path
if these two users are social contacts, i.e., there is an edge
between these two users in the corresponding social graph.
Similarly, the malware can propagate from one compromised
user to another user with probability of success pℓ via the
proximity propagation path if these two users are within a
physical contact distance.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 display the attack successfulness and
risk of exposure for transmissive attacks in the mobile social
network, respectively. It can be observed that the inclusion of
social propagation paths can significantly enhance the attack
successfulness. For example, after 30 hours since launching
a transmissive attack, the attack successfulness of utilizing
both social and mobile propagation paths can be doubled
compared with the attack successfulness of only exploiting
mobile propagation paths. However, the induced risk metric is
also amplified as shown in Fig. 5.
Additional experiments of different parameter configura-
tions show similar trends in attack successfulness and risk
of exposure, which are discussed in the supplementary file.
These results suggest that propagation path diversity can
facilitate transmissive attacks at the price of potentially am-
plified exposure. In addition, how current epidemic models
can be improved to model transmissive attacks in such a
heterogeneous network is an active research area.
VI. SOME ONGOING CHALLENGES AND OPEN RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
Here we discuss several ongoing challenges and open re-
search questions related to transmissive attacks.
• Lateral movement detection and prevention.
Unlike disruption attacks (e.g., denial of service) that
often cause distinguishable anomalous activities, lateral
movement attacks (e.g., privilege escalation that insid-
iously acquires user credentials) are difficult to detect.
Transmissive attacks fall into one category of lateral
movement attacks due to their stealthy transmissive na-
ture. If detecting lateral movement is implausible, one
may shift attention to designing a resilient cyber system
that can constrain the damage induced by such attacks.
• Transmissive attacks in network of networks (NoNs).
Network of networks (NoNs) is an intuitive explanation
of modern communication systems with intrinsic layered
structures and heterogeneous networks. The layers of
the Internet architecture can be operated by different
protocols, and a device can have multiple communication
resources (e.g., cellular, WiFi and Bluetooth modules).
As horizontal malware propagations within a single
layer/system can be straightforward by leveraging similar
vulnerabilities, vertical malware propagations traversing
different layers/systems can be more difficult due to
lack of common vulnerabilities or implementation of
additional security rules. In terms of bio-inspired attacks,
transmissive attacks that are self-evolving and adaptive to
the NoN environment can be a vital threat.
• Data-driven inference for attack and defense.
In a data-rich era, our cyber footage is everywhere and
easy to track. Both attackers and defenders should make
use of available data collected from different sources to
infer vulnerabilities in a system. Notably, modern tech-
nology enables an adversary to optimize his/her attack
strategy based on the inference results from the collected
data prior to launching a transmissive attack, known
as the inference attacks. For instance, personal trace
information such as GPS signals or locations revealed
by online social networking activities can be directly
observed or indirectly inferred from user-centric data.
• Evolutionary resilience of dynamic systems.
In many cases the underlying communication system
where a transmissive attack takes place is an ever-
changing system due to variations in time, traffic flows,
evolution of communication technology, and so on.
Therefore, a general notion of resilience for such a
dynamic system is necessary to quantify network stability
that can vary with time, which we call as evolutionary
resilience. Notably, biology models such as ecological
systems, predator-prey models, and evolutionary game
theory that target at evolutionary stability in time-varying
coupled systems may be well mapped to analyze trans-
missive attacks in dynamic systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces an emerging attack pattern called
transmissive attack that leverages diverse communication paths
to approach the target and accomplish its task. Inspired by
biology, we provide an overview of commonly used epidemic
models for communication systems and connect the dots be-
tween transmissive attacks and epidemic models. We perform
simulations via two widely used mobility models and conduct
experiments in mobile social networks to demonstrate the
utility of epidemic models for assessing attack successfulness
and risk of exposure, and we also discuss some ongoing
research challenges and open research questions related to
transmissive attacks.
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Fig. 6: The block diagram of common components in an Android
system and how they are involved in the propagation of transmissive
attacks. An attacker can deploy malicious codes to application market
places and wait for unaware users to install the deployed codes
passively (paths 1-1 and 1-2), or compromise a device by using
remote vulnerabilities and inject executables directly into the device
(path 2-1). Once malicious codes are in operation, they can discover
nearby network links (paths 1-3 and 2-2) and social links (paths 1-4
and 2-3), and then attempt to launch transmissive attacks at either
the network level (paths 1-3 and 2-2) or the application level (paths
1-5 and 2-4).
VIII. SUPPLEMENTARY FILE
This seciton is a supplement that illustrates horizontal
and vertical propagation involved in transmissive attacks and
includes additional experimental results of simulating trans-
missive attacks with the CRAWDAD mobile-social interaction
traces10.
We first show how attackers compromise a mobile device
and propagate malicious codes to nearby devices in Fig. 6. An
attacker usually has two choices to gain access to a device.
One is to deploy malicious codes to application market places
and wait for unaware users to install the deployed codes
passively (paths 1-1 and 1-2). The other is to compromise a
device by using remote vulnerabilities and inject executables
directly into the device (path 2-1). Once malicious codes are
in operation, they can discover nearby network links (paths
1-3 and 2-2) and social links (paths 1-4 and 2-3), and then
attempt to launch transmissive attacks at either the network
level (paths 1-3 and 2-2) or the application level (paths 1-5
and 2-4). Remote vulnerabilities are important for successful
transmissive attacks, since mobile and wearable devices may
be not accessible via Internet. Therefore, attackers have to
identify possible remote vulnerabilities in the system. For
example, the recent vulnerabilities identified in Stagefright
library, which is a part of Media Framework in Fig. 6,
is one good option to launch transmissive attacks: it is a
built-in component that is associated with many services and
applications.
10CRAWDAD dataset thlab/sigcomm2009 (v. 2012-07-15). Available at
http://crawdad.org/thlab/sigcomm2009/20120715
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Fig. 7: Successful rate for transmissive attacks under different con-
figurations. The results are averaged over 10000 trials. For different
time instances, it is observed that the increase in ps or pℓ can facilitate
transmissive attacks.
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Fig. 8: Risk metric for transmissive attacks under different configu-
rations. The results are averaged over 10000 trials. For different time
instances, it is observed that the increase in ps or pℓ also leads to
higher risk.
We investigate the attack successful rates and the corre-
sponding risk metrics under different configurations, namely
the social and proximal infection rates ps and pℓ, for perfor-
mance comparison. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the attack success-
fulness and the corresponding risk of exposure with varying
configurations at four different time instances, respectively. It
is observed that both the attack successfulness and the risk
metric increase with the configuration parameters ps and pℓ.
These results indicate nontrivial tradeoffs between the attack
successfulness and the risk metric.
If the attacker has the freedom of manipulating ps and
pℓ, then assigning maximal values to these two parameters is
usually not the best strategy, since doing so incurs huge risk,
and thereby the attacks can be in vain due to high exposure.
Instead, the optimal strategy of an attacker is to first identify
the risk the attacker is willing to take, and then find a set
of configuration parameters that maximize the successful rate,
which can be casted as a configuration parameter optimization
problem with risk constraints.
